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UNLOCKING THE FINAL CODE TO MANAGING FINANCIAL RISK IN THE 
PASSENGER AIR TRAVEL INDUSTRY 
Sunder Raghavan, Alfonso Canella, Maneesh Sharma and Ron Mau 




This paper reports our findings on the effectiveness of revenue hedging1 using the newly proposed 
price indices by Skytra. In the example analyzed we find that when hedged, if United Airlines’ 
transatlantic ticket price yields fell as much as 98%, its revenues would have only fallen 8%. 
 
Firstly, we explore revenue hedging and the evolution of financial risk management practices for the 
aviation industry. Until now, the industry has been confined to hedging risks posed by its major cost 
drivers, including fuel, foreign exchange and interest rates. However, even the most significant driver 
of these costs (fuel) makes up only 20 to 30% % of the total cost and until now, airlines did not have 
an ability to hedge the revenue side of their profit and loss account, limiting the impact of their 
hedging strategies. Skytra, a subsidiary of Airbus, has recently proposed a novel approach to 
managing the yield risk for airlines, which will complement the cost side hedging. Further, the ability 
to hedge yield would make the treasury functions of an airline more complete, by allowing it to focus 
on its two most significant drivers of economic outcome- yield and fuel.  
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1. INTRODUCTION  
 
Risk management is the practice of defining the risk level a firm desires, identifying the risk level the 
firm currently has, and using derivatives or other means to adjust the actual level of risk to the desired 
level of risk (Chance and Brooks, 2016). For example, for an airline, its core activity and expertise is 
in transporting people safely from one destination to the other. However, airlines in transporting 
people and goods from one place to another, assume a number of risks over which they have little or 
no control or expertise. These risks such as the cost of fuel, borrowing costs and exchange rate have 
a significant influence on the profitability of airlines. Although some airlines merely accept all these 
risks as part of doing business, others choose to actively manage these risks by hedging their fuel 
price, interest rates and currency.  
 
Whether airlines choose to hedge their costs or not, they have long recognized their uncontrollable 
risks from rising fuel prices, interest rates or unfavorable currency movements. While the cost side 
of the aviation business draws most of the attention, it is the inability to exercise significant control 
over revenues, which makes the aviation business riskier and more volatile than other service centric 
businesses such as retail and consulting. Effective risk management, therefore, must consider both 
the revenue and cost of an airline. However, until recently, airlines did not have the tools or the market 
infrastructure to hedge their revenues. Skytra, a subsidiary of Airbus, is developing the infrastructure 
necessary for an airline to hedge its yield. This introductory paper, which is the first in a series of 
research papers, examines the history of the airline industry; the tools and mechanisms airlines use 
to hedge and makes a case for revenue hedging using the infrastructure proposed by Skytra. 
 
1 The Skytra Price Indices can help the airlines only partially hedge their revenues, as they are Price Indices, and 
therefore, do not give volume protection. However using Price Indices to hedge revenue makes sense, as it’s the most 
variable part used by Airline Revenue Management team to hedge their revenue. 
  
The paper is organized as follows. This introductory section looks at the nature of the airline business 
it’s current and historical state and discusses the major cost drivers in the industry. Section 2, 
discusses the tools and infrastructure proposed by Skytra to enable an airline to hedge its yield. 
Section 3, illustrates through an example, how airlines can hedge their yields using the Skytra Price 
Indices. Section 4 concludes and discusses future research papers in this series. 
 
1.1 History of the Airline Industry  
 
The airline industry today can trace its origins to the discovery of the jet engine in 19303 and the 
deregulation act of 1978. With the discovery of the jet engine, jet-powered aircraft became the 
primary mode of long-distance travel in the world and the deregulation act ushered in an era of free 
market-competition in the airline industry. The growth of the low cost business model pioneered in 
the U.S by Southwest airlines in the 1970’s, and later emulated by Ryan Air and EasyJet in Europe, 
further intensified competition in the industry. While competition in the airline industry has been in 
general beneficial to the consumers, by making airline travel more affordable, the increased 
competition combined with the cyclical nature of the industry has resulted in low profit margins and 
pushed the industry repeatedly into bankruptcy over the last decades. 
 
1.2 The Economics of the Airline Business 
 
The airline industry has therefore evolved into a risky business over the years due to its cyclical 
nature, high capital intensity compounded by its high operational (high fixed cost relative to variable 
cost) and financial leverage (high debt to equity) and regulatory oversight. This has made it difficult 
for the industry to be consistently profitable. For example, the return on invested capital (ROIC) for 
the industry as a whole over the last two and half decades has ranged between 0% and 7% (IATA, 
2013). Not considering the impact of COVID-19, the current operating margin forecast for the 
industry is less than 6.0% for 2020 (Pearce, 2019), which is amongst the lowest across major industry 
sectors. Further, due to its inherent characteristics outlined above, the airline industry is susceptible 
to large and destabilizing external shocks. Over the last few decades, the industry has been shaken to 
its core by such disturbances as   the oil crisis of 1970s; 9/11 terrorist attack; global recession in 2008; 
SARS, Ebola, H1N1 and now COVID-19. In each instance, the industry profitability was impacted 
in a severely negative fashion. In 2001 and 2008, for example, the industry-wide operating margins 
had dwindled to -4% and 0% respectively. (Pearce, 2019). Such disruptions only highlight the 
aviation industry’s glaring need to have better control over the risks arising from its uncontrollable 
costs and yield. 
 
Despite these challenges, air travel remains one of the safest mode of travel. The airline industry also 
has been remarkably resilient and has adapted to the new challenges posed by increased competition 
from the low cost carriers by unbundling their product and increasing their ancillary revenues such 
as baggage fees, charging for onboard food and services, creating new no frills basic economy fare 
class, and practicing capacity discipline. Airlines, especially in the U.S, have become leaner by 
consolidating and shedding their pension liabilities as they have remerged from bankruptcy. While 
airlines, particularly in Europe, have successfully hedged their fuel expenses to control one of their 
most important costs.  
 
3 Sir Frank Whittle invented the turbojet engine and patented it in 1930, while the de Havilland DH 106 Comet was the 
world's first commercial jet airliner.  
 
However, the fundamental risks facing the airline industry remain. The fiercely competitive nature 
of the industry has prevented the airlines from passing on their increases in their uncontrollable cost 
such as fuel to the consumers in terms of increased ticket prices (Carter, et al., 2006). The high 
operating and financial leverage in the industry has made it vulnerable to business cycles and external 
shocks and has pushed the industry repeatedly into bankruptcy. IATA currently estimates the global 
airline industry losses from the current COVID-19 pandemic will be $314 billion and traffic measured 
in revenue passenger kilometers (RPK) will be down 48% this year (IATA, 2020). If the industry has 
to remerge from this crisis, it needs to take a hard look at not only controlling its cost but also 
stabilizing its revenue.  
 
The concept of revenue hedging, though prevalent in other industries (it has been widely used in the 
farming industry for over a century, where rice, corn or wheat farmers would sell futures contracts to 
protect themselves from decreases in future prices), it has been rarely practiced in the airline industry. 
Part of the reasons why revenue hedging has not been popular is that the necessary market 
infrastructure and price indices did not previously exist. Skytra, a subsidiary of Airbus, has created 
the Price Indices and is establishing the market infrastructure necessary for airlines to hedge yields.  
 
2. SKYTRA PRICE INDICES 
 
As alluded to in the previous section, until recently airlines could not hedge their yield stream because 
no mechanism existed to “lock in” yields (average fare per passenger per kilometer). The yield indices 
proposed by Skytra present a new and significant tool that will allow the implementation of a 
comprehensive risk management strategy. Skytra Price Indices are constructed and managed to reflect 
the wholesale price of air travel per km flown by an individual passenger (RRPK) in identified 
markets both regional & interregional, for economy class travel (Skytra, 2020).  
 
Currently Skytra publishes 6 Price indices, based on average price of economy class fares (namely 
Europe, North America, Asia-Pacific, Europe-North America, Asia Pacific-Europe, Asia Pacific-
North America, covering 70% of traffic) but will eventually publish 28 indices (7 regional and 21 
inter-regional indices). For each market, Skytra calculates and publishes a “daily value” and a twenty-
eight day rolling average of the daily value. The data, methodology are identical in both cases, and 
the rolling average will be the average of the 27 previous day plus present day values, and will be 
published alongside the daily value. According to Skytra, pre COVID-19 ticket price volatility ranges 
from 7% to 22% for the different regional and interregional indices. While all airlines will benefit 
from hedging their yield, airlines operating in a higher volatility region, are expected to benefit more, 
from hedging their yield. In addition, Skytra is in the process of getting approvals from the UK’s 
Financial Conduct Authority to be a registered Benchmark Administrator for its Price Indices and is 
also working with financial firms to establish the trading venue infrastructure.  
2.1 Parties and Counter-parties 
Trading in Skytra indices is subject to the same market forces as any other platform and instruments. 
That is, for the airlines to be able to confidently engage in trading of Skytra indices, the market for 
these indices must be robust, including buyers/sellers or parties and counter–parties.  
The most natural sellers of these indices will be airlines, lessors, investors and speculators who will 
hedge against a fall in the airline yields (RRPK) by selling futures, buying puts, building collars 
(selling a call option and purchasing a put option) and using swaps.  On the other side, Business-to-
business (B2B) travel agents or large multinational corporates, Business-to-consumers (B2C) travel 
agents and airports, hotels, investors and speculators would be natural buyers of the hedging 
contracts by buying futures, call options and using swaps. By trading in the Skytra Price Indices, 
travel agents can therefore, pass on stability or new forms of optionality to individual travelers or 
corporates. 
 
2.2 Contract Specifications 
The Skytra contract would be a standardized contract and would accommodate different exchange 
types such as central limit order book (CLOB), Request for Quote (RFQ) and process trade. The unit 
of trade for each contract would be 100,000 RPKs. The contract would trade during normal European 
trading hours with windows to process trades and use RFQ and would allow for the full range of 
standard order types and strategy trading functionality. The contracts will be for the next three serial 
months, quarters up to 2 years out and would be cash settled. 
3. HEDGING USING SKYTRA PRICE INDICES 
As outlined above, an airline can use the Skytra Price Indices to hedge their yield by selling futures, 
building a collar (selling a call option and buying a put option) or using a swap. This section 
outlines how an airline, such as United Airlines, can use a collar strategy to hedge its yield. 
 
3.1: Building a collar to hedge yield: An example using United Airlines Transatlantic Yield 
 
A collar is a combination of a put option and a call option. For United Airlines (UAL), planning to 
hedge its yield, a collar strategy involves buying an out-of-the-money put below the current index 
value and selling a call. The purchase of a put option provides protection during the life of the option 
against downward yield movements below the strike price. The premium received from selling the 
call option helps offset the cost of the put option. By establishing a collar strategy, a minimum and 
maximum bound is created around a hedger’s position until the expiration of the options. One can 
create a zero cost collar (where call and put premiums are equal) or a premium collar (where call 
premiums are higher than put premiums). Collars, therefore, are a highly efficient vehicle for getting 
protection from unfavorable movements in prices and enables the airlines to reduce their yield 
volatility. 
  
In order to show how UAL can effectively hedge its yield by using the Skytra Price indices, this 
example uses, UAL’s Transatlantic (TA) yield and builds a Zero Cost collar strategy. A Zero Cost 
collar strategy involves writing a call and buying a put, where the call premium equals the put 
premium based on a pre-selected yield UAL would like to protect.  
UAL’s 2019 TA revenues were USD$7.387x109.  Skytra’s TA RRPK index for the same period stood 
at 0.087. Thus, UAL’s (RRPK) can be obtained by dividing its TA revenues by the Skytra Price Index 
value4. Doing so, results in $8.491x1010 revenue passenger kilometers. Each of Skytra’s option 
contracts represents 1.0x105 kilometers; thus hedging the entire TA yield stream would require 
849,080 option contracts.  
The Black-Scholes-Merton (BSM) model (1973) is used to compute the call and put prices using the 
following inputs: a risk free rate of 0.12% (the 3-month Treasury as of April 28, 2020), time to 
expiration of three months (for simplicity’s sake – we assume the first contracts will have shorter 
 
4 To simplify the analysis we assume that United Airlines average ticket prices are equal to the Skytra Price Index but 
different airlines could have average ticket prices, which are cheaper or more expensive than the Skytra Price Index. 
maturities) and a Skytra TA volatility of 11% (calculated using Skytra Price Index data). The index 
is currently calculated to be at 0.1307. It is then assumed, that UAL sells a call with a strike price of 
0.1427 (an arbitrary number), above the current index value, and purchases a put at a strike price of 
0.1200, which is below the current index price. Based on these inputs, the BSM model yields a call 
contract price of $18.  Applying this price to the 849,080 contracts, UAL could conceivably collect 
$14,978,430 selling these calls. Using the above inputs, but with a strike price of 0.1200 for 
purchasing the put, the put premium is also obtained as $18/contract and the cost of purchasing the 
put be $14,978,435, the same as the call premium collected, making this a Zero Cost collar. Figure 1 
below shows a graphical depiction of the collar. 
If the index settles above 0.1427, the counterparty, which purchased the call option, would exercise 
the call option and UAL would make a loss on the contract. On the contrary, if the index falls below 
0.1200, UAL will exercise its put option to protect its yield. The collar strategy therefore provides a 
range of the index with the upper bound at the call strike price and lower floor at the put strike price.  
The numerical example in Table 1, below shows how a collar strategy can protect UAL’s yield under 
different scenarios, based on an assumed call strike price of 0.1407 and a put strike price of 0.1200. 
Scenario 1: Index value is 0.00255 
In this scenario, since the index value is below $0.1200, UAL will exercise its put option. Further, 
since the index is below 0.1407, the call would not be exercised. The payoff from the hedge contract 
can be computed as follows: 
((0.12 – 0.0025) * 849080*100,000)/ 106 = $9,977m.  
If UAL were unhedged, its total revenue would be  
(0.0025 * 84,908,045,977)/106 = $212 m. 
However if UAL were hedged, adding the collar payoff, the total revenue for UAL would be  
Collar Payoff ($9,977m) + Unhedged Revenue ($212m) = $10,189m. 
Scenario 2: Index Value is 0.1030. 
In this scenario, since the index value is once again below 0.1200, UAL will exercise its put option. 
Further, since the index is below 0.1407, the call would not be exercised. The payoff from the hedge 
contract can be computed as follows: 
((0.12 – 0.1030) * 849080*100,000)/ 106 = $1443m.  
If UAL were unhedged, its total revenue would be  
(0.0025 * 84,908,045,977)/106 = $8746m 
However if UAL were hedged, adding the collar payoff, the total revenue for UAL would be  
Collar Payoff ($1443m) + Unhedged Revenue ($8746m) = $10,189m. 
Scenario 3: Index Value is 0.1307 
 
5 The Skytra Price Index value chosen is an arbitrary value to show how a dramatic fall caused by an extreme stress 
event, such as the recent pandemic, will help protect airline yield. 
 
In this case both the call option (index below 0.1307) and the put option (Index above 0.12) will not 
be exercised and the color payoff would be zero and the unhedged revenue would equal the hedged 
revenue of $11,097m (0.1307 * 84,908,045,977)/ 106 = $11,097m) 
Scenario 4: Index Value is 0.1500 
In this scenario, the index is above the call exercise price of 0.1407 and the purchaser of the call 
option, sold by UAL will exercise the call option. UAL will lose from the collar contract.  
Pay off from collar contract: 
((0.1407 – 0.1500) * 849080*100,000)/ 106 = -617m 
If UAL were unhedged, its total revenue would be  
((0.1500* 84,908,045,977)/106 = $12,736m 
However if UAL were hedged, adding (subtracting) the collar payoff, the total for UAL would be: 
Collar Payoff ($-617m) + Unhedged Revenue ($12,736m) = $12,119m. 
UAL’s Zero Cost collar strategy, therefore, will stabilize its revenue fluctuation between $12,119m 
and $10,189m with no upfront cost. More importantly, if UAL was unhedged, and the index declined 
from 0.1307 to 0.0025, UAL’s revenue would have dropped to $212m from $11,097m or a 98.09% 
drop! However if UAL had hedged using a collar, the drop in revenue would be from $11,097m to 
$10,189m or only 8.08%. This shows the collar strategy using the Skytra Price Indices would offer 
considerable downside protection to UAL. 
On the flip side, however, if the index rises above 0.1407, the call would be exercised and UAL would 
lose any upside revenue potential from being unhedged. Thus if the index rises to 0.1500, UAL’s 
unhedged revenue would be $12,736m, while its hedged revenue would be $12,119m. 
The net-cost-zero collar for UAL by selling an out-of-the-money call with a strike price of 0.1427 
and buying an out-of-the-money put with a strike price of 0.1200 both with an asset price of 0.1307 
under different scenarios is summarized below in Table 1. 
 





Yield Unhedged Yield Hedged 
using a Collar 
0.0025 9,977 212 10,189 
0.1030 1,443 8,746 10,189 
0.1307 ------- 11,097 11,097 
0.1500 (617) 12,736 12,119 
Note: The payoffs are calculated assuming a call strike price of 0.1407 and a put strike price of 
0.1200  
 
Figure 1: Collar Payoff for United Airlines 
 
SECTION 4: CONCLUSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
This paper, the first in a series of research papers, introduced the airline industry and the economic 
and regulatory constraints under which it functions. The airline industry is a cyclical and capital-
intensive industry prone to exogenous shocks. Airlines continually face many challenges including 
volatile oil prices, weak economic conditions, labor issues and other legacy issues. The industry is 
vulnerable to event risks such as terrorism, pandemics, political instability and natural disasters that 
lower passenger travel and could limit access to capital markets. Airline risk management strategies 
to date, have involved hedging their uncontrollable costs, such as, fuel, borrowing and currency 
fluctuations. Unfortunately, even its most volatile cost, fuel, only accounts for 20% to 30% of its 
overall cost. Effective risk management at the airlines should involve not only managing its risk from 
its cost side but must also take into account its revenue.  
 
Until recently, however, airlines did not have the market infrastructure to hedge their yields. Recently, 
Skytra, a subsidiary of Airbus has proposed the needed infrastructure for airlines to hedge their yield.  
 
This paper introduced the Skytra Price Indices and showed how a Zero Cost Collar strategy for UAL 
would have no upfront cost, but would offer considerable downside protection to decline in its yield, 
while giving up some upside potential if the index rises above the call strike price. In fact the analysis 
in this paper revealed that if UAL’s TA yield fell by as much as 98%, UAL’s hedged TA revenue 
would fall only by a mere 8%! The cost of this downside protection for UAL is that if the index settles 
above 0.1407, UAL’s yield would be capped at $12,119m and they will lose any upside potential 
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The next paper would explore the other side of the market. Whilst airlines deliver transportation as a 
service their customers are the entire world of air travelling passengers, represented in the majority 
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